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Abstract
This note proposes a simple, more precise, necessary condition for symmetry
breaking in Matsuyama (Financial Market Globalization, Symmetry-Breaking, and
Endogenous Inequality of Nations, Econometrica, 2004 ), i.e., the positive interest
rate response to income changes, which essentially arises from the assumptions of
financial frictions and minimum investment size requirement of individual projects.
This condition also holds under the more general settings. Thus, this note offers an
empirically testable hypothesis, i.e., Matsuyama’s symmetry breaking is more likely,
if the interest rate response to income changes is positive and sufficiently large.
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1 Introduction
Matsuyama (2004) shows that, under certain conditions, countries with identical funda-
mentals converge, independent of initial income levels, to the same, unique, and stable
steady state under international financial autarky (IFA, hereafter), while financial mar-
ket globalization (FMG, hereafter) may destabilize this symmetric steady state in the
sense that countries with relatively high (low) initial income levels may converge to a new
steady state with the income level higher (lower) than that under IFA. Matsuyama (2004)
summarizes three general conditions for symmetry breaking in section 7:
1. For a fixed domestic interest rate, the domestic investment is an increasing function
of the wealth held by the domestic entrepreneurs in the lower range.
2. Domestic investment increases the wealth held by domestic entrepreneurs (more
than that of foreign entrepreneurs).
3. The domestic interest rate adjusts to balance domestic supply and domestic demand
for credit in the absence of the international financial market, while it is linked to
the foreign interest rate in the presence of the international financial market.
In this note, I first set up a model satisfying the three general conditions mentioned
above and show that FMG does not lead to symmetry breaking there. Then, I identify a
simple, necessary condition for Matsuyama’s symmetry breaking from the credit market
perspective, i.e., the positive interest rate response to income changes, which essentially
arises from the assumptions of financial frictions and minimum investment size require-
ment of individual projects. As my first contribution, this positive relationship should be
augmented as a more precise condition into section 7 of Matsuyama (2004).
The intuition is as follows. Suppose that the world economy consists of a continuum of
countries with identical fundamentals except for the initial income level. In each country,
some agents have both the technology and the funds to run the investment projects and
are called entrepreneurs; without either the technology or the funds, other agents lend
their net wealth to the credit market and are called households. If the interest rate is
below the marginal rate of return to investment, entrepreneurs prefer to finance their
investment using external funds. However, due to limited commitment, they are subject
to borrowing constraints and must also put their net wealth in the project. The higher
the entrepreneurial net wealth, the more they can borrow and invest.
In this model, capital accumulation and the resulting changes in aggregate income
affect the interest rate through two channels. First, given that the neoclassical production
function has the decreasing marginal product of capital, capital accumulation reduces the
marginal rate of return to investment and the interest rate tends to fall. This is called
the neoclassical effect. Second, capital accumulation raises the individuals’ income and
net wealth, triggering the credit market adjustment.
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In the absence of minimum investment size requirement, capital accumulation affects
the credit market on the intensive margin. The higher individual’s net wealth allows
entrepreneurs (households) to borrow (lend) more. The neoclassical effect reduces the
pledgeable value per unit of entrepreneurial investment and dampens the expansion of
their debt capacity, implying that the rise in the aggregate credit demand is dominated
by that in the aggregate credit supply. Thus, capital accumulation reduces the interest
rate and the interest rate is lower in the rich than in the poor country under IFA; under
FMG, financial capital flows are from the rich to the poor country, narrowing the initial
cross-country income gap. Eventually, countries with identical fundamentals except for
the initial income converge to the same steady state as under IFA. Thus, symmetry
breaking does not arise, although the three conditions mentioned above are satisfied.
In the presence of fixed or minimum investment size requirement, capital accumulation
affects the credit market not only on the intensive margin and but also on the extensive
margin. Take the case of fixed investment size requirement as an example. The higher
individual’s net wealth reduces the credit demand of individual entrepreneur as well as
allows more agents to become entrepreneurs with leveraged investment. The intensive-
margin (extensive-margin) effect tends to reduce (raise) the aggregate credit demand.
In the net term, the size of the expansion in aggregate credit demand is identical as in
the absence of minimum investment size requirement. Meanwhile, the higher individual’s
net wealth raises the lending of individual household and reduces the mass of lenders
(households). The intensive-margin (extensive-margin) effect tends to raise (reduce) the
aggregate credit supply. The intensive-margin effect is identical as in the absence of
minimum investment size requirement, while the extensive-margin effect is new here. If
the negative extensive-margin effect on the credit supply side dominates the negative
neoclassical effect on the credit demand side, capital accumulation raises the interest rate
and the interest rate is higher in the rich than in the poor country under IFA; under
FMG, financial capital flows are from the poor to the rich country, widening the cross-
country income gap. Eventually, countries with identical fundamentals except for the
initial income level may converge to the steady states with different income levels, i.e.,
FMG leads to symmetry breaking. Here, fixed or minimum investment size requirement
gives rise to the distinct extensive-margin effect on the credit supply side, which is key to
the positive relationship between the interest rate and income changes.
Kikuchi (2008), Kikuchi and Stachurski (2009), Matsuyama (2005, 2007, 2008, 2012,
2013) apply the mechanism of symmetry breaking to the topics on endogenous fluctu-
ations, inequality, credit traps, credit cycles, and other aggregate implications of credit
market imperfections. However, it is not clear how to empirically test the theoretical
conditions supporting this mechanism in these papers. As my second contribution, a
straightforward, empirically testable hypothesis is proposed, i.e., Matsuyama’s symmetry
breaking is more likely to arise if the real interest rate response to income changes is
positive and sufficiently large.1
1A comprehensive empirical investigation on the interest rate response to income changes is beyond
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Matsuyama (2004) claims in subsection 7.1 and 7.2 that symmetry breaking may also
exist in the presence of wealth inequality and minimum (instead of fixed) investment size
requirement, while a complete characterization of multiple steady states is “hopelessly
complicated”. As my third contribution, I incorporate wealth inequality and minimum
investment size requirement in a generalized setting and provide a complete, analytical
characterization of symmetry breaking, formally proving Matsuyama’s conjecture.
As a side note, there is a technical error in one of the boundary conditions for symmetry
breaking in figure 5 of Matsuyama (2004).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model and
compares the impacts of FMG on the model dynamics in the absence and in the presence
of fixed investment size requirement, respectively. Section 3 checks the robustness in a
generalized setting. The appendix collects some extensions and technical proofs.
2 The Basic Model
Consider a two-period overlapping generations model.2 The world economy consists of
a continuum of identical countries, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Agents live for two periods,
young and old. There is no population growth and the population size of each generation
is normalized at one in each country. When young, each agent is endowed with one
unit of labor which is supplied inelastically to aggregate production. A final good is
internationally tradable and chosen as the numeraire. It can be consumed or transformed
into capital goods. Capital goods are non-tradable and used together with labor to
produce final goods contemporaneously. Capital fully depreciates after production. The
markets for final goods, capital goods, and labor are perfectly competitive. Y it denotes
aggregate output of final goods, L = 1 and Kit denote the aggregate inputs of labor and
capital goods, ωit and v
i
t denote the wage rate and the price of capital in country i ∈ [0, 1].
Y it =
(
Kit
α
)α(
L
1− α
)1−α
, where α ∈ (0, 1), (1)
vitK
i
t = αY
i
t and ω
i
tL = (1− α)Y it , (2)
Agents only consume when old and they save their entire labor income when young.
In order to show the critical role of fixed investment size requirement in determining
Matsuyama’s symmetry breaking,3 I compare two alternative model settings as follows.
In the first setting, a fraction η ∈ (0, 1) of agents in each generation are endowed
with the linear project to transform final goods in period t into capital goods in period
t + 1 at the rate of R, and are called entrepreneurs. The mass of entrepreneurs η is
exogenously fixed4, while the investment size of individual project mit is endogenous. With
the scope of this note and is left for future research.
2The model setting closely resembles that of Matsuyama (2004).
3Section 3 shows in a generalized model that minimum (instead of fixed) investment size requirement
is an critical assumption for symmetry breaking.
4Appendix A.1 endogenizes the mass of entrepreneurs and the results in this setting still hold there.
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no productive projects, other agents lend out their labor income and are called households.
Given the fixed mass of entrepreneurs and the linearity of individual projects, aggregate
investment takes place on the intensive margin, Kit+1 = Rm
i
tη. With no fixed investment
size requirement for individual projects, it is called setting N.
In the second setting, each agent is endowed with an indivisible project5 to transform
m units of final goods in period t into Rm units of capital goods in period t+1.6 If ωit < m,
an agent must borrow m−ωit to start its project and the aggregate resource is not sufficient
to allow all agents to start the projects. According to Matsuyama (2004), random credit
rationing allows a fraction ηit ∈ (0, 1) of agents to start the projects with the loans, m−ωit,
and they are called entrepreneurs, while other agents only lend out the labor income and
are called households. Different from setting N, the project size m is exogenously fixed,
while the mass of entrepreneurs ηit is endogenous. Although the fixed investment size
results in the non-convexity of the individual production set, Matsuyama (2007, 2008)
argues that assuming a continuum of homogeneous agents convexifies the production set
and aggregate investment takes place on the extensive margin, Kit+1 = Rmη
i
t. With f ixed
investment size requirement for individual projects, it is called setting F.
tm
t1t Rmk 
Setting N 
1tk 
O
Rmk 1t 
Setting F 
m
Rm
O
tm
1tk 
t1t Rmk 
Setting M 
m
Rm
O
tm
1tk 
Figure 1: Projects in Various Settings
Figure 1 shows the productive function of individual project in various settings. The
project output in setting N is linear in the input, kt+1 = Rmt. With fixed investment size
requirement, the project output is zero for the input mt < m; it is constant at Rm for the
input mt ≥ m in setting F. In section 3, I analyze a setting with minimum investment
size requirement (setting M), i.e., the project output is zero for mt < m; it is linear in the
input kt+1 = Rmt for mt ≥ m. I use ηit and mit to denote the mass of entrepreneurs and
the project size in the model description. Setting N is characterized by the fixed mass of
entrepreneurs, ηit = η, while setting F is characterized by the fixed project size, m
i
t = m.
In each setting, I analyze the dynamic properties of the equilibrium allocations under
two scenarios, i.e., IFA where agents can only borrow or lend domestically, international
capital flows are forbidden, and the gross interest rate rit clears the credit market at the
5Section 3 relaxes the assumption of project indivisibility and the results in this setting still hold.
6Matsuyama (2004) implicitly normalizes the individual project size at m = 1, while I allow it to be
a free parameter and consider how it may affect the possibility of symmetry breaking.
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country level; FMG where agents can borrow or lend domestically and aboard, there
are no barriers to international borrowing/lending, and the gross interest rate rit = r
∗
t
equalizes across countries.7 Let Φit denote the financial capital outflows from country i,
with negative values indicating the financial capital inflows. The interest rate cannot
exceed the marginal rate of return to investment, rit ≤ vit+1R; otherwise, entrepreneurs
would lend out their funds rather than start the project. Matsuyama (2004) calls it the
entrepreneurs’ profitability constraints.
Consider the agents of the generation born in period t. If rit < v
i
t+1R, entrepreneurs
prefer to fund their projects with loans, i.e., dit = m
i
t − ωit. Due to limited commitment,
they are subject to the borrowing constraint,
ritd
i
t = r
i
t(m
i
t − ωit) ≤ λvit+1Rmit. (3)
λ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the level of financial development, which is identical for all countries.8
Let ψit ≡ ω
i
t
mit
denote the equity-investment ratio. The equity rate is defined as,
Γit =
vit+1Rm
i
t − ritdit
ωit
= vit+1R + (v
i
t+1R− rit)
(
1
ψit
− 1
)
. (4)
The term (vit+1R−rit)
(
1
ψit
− 1
)
captures the excess return due to the leveraged investment.
If rit < v
i
t+1R, the leveraged investment leads to Γ
i
t > v
i
t+1R > r
i
t so that entrepreneurs
borrow up to the limit to maximize the leverage ratio ( 1
ψit
− 1); if rit = vit+1R, the zero
excess return leads to Γit = r
i
t so that entrepreneurs do not borrow to the limit. In the
following, the private rates of return refer to the equity rate and the interest rate, while
the social rate of return refers to the marginal rate of return to investment.
Households save the labor income when young and consume the financial return when
old; entrepreneurs finance the project using the loans and their labor income when young,
and then, consume the project revenue net of debt repayment when old,
ci,ht+1 = r
i
tω
i
t, and c
i,e
t+1 = v
i
t+1Rm
i
t − ritdit = Γitωit. (5)
The markets for capital goods, credit, and final goods clear simultaneously,
Kit+1 = Rm
i
tη
i
t, (6)
ηit(m
i
t − ωit) = (1− ηit)ωit, (7)
(1− ηit)ci,ht + ηitci,et + ηitmit = Y it . (8)
Definition 1. A market equilibrium under IFA is a set of allocations of households,
{ci,ht }, entrepreneurs, {mit, ci,et }, and aggregate variables, {Y it , Kit , ωit, vit,Γit, ηit, rit}, satisfy-
ing equations (1)-(7).
ηit = η is exogenously fixed in setting N, while m
i
t = m is exogenously fixed in setting F.
7Following Matsuyama (2004), I exclude FDI flows by assumption. von Hagen and Zhang (2011, 2014)
analyze the joint determination of financial capital flows and FDI flows in setting N.
8See Matsuyama (2007, 2008) for detailed discussion on formulating the borrowing constraint in such
a way. von Hagen and Zhang (2011, 2014) analyze the case where countries differ in λ.
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Under FMG, the equilibrium conditions are identical as under IFA except for the credit
market clearing conditions at the country and at the world level,
ηit(m
i
t − ωit) = (1− ηit)ωit − Φit, (9)∫ 1
0
Φitdi = 0. (10)
Definition 2. A market equilibrium under FMG is a set of allocations of households,
{ci,ht }, entrepreneurs, {mit, ci,et }, and aggregate variables, {Y it , Kit , ωit, vit,Γit, ηit,Φit}, satis-
fying equations (1)-(6) and (9), and the world interest rate r∗t is determined by the world
credit market equilibrium condition (10).
ηit = η is exogenously fixed in setting N, while m
i
t = m is exogenously fixed in setting F.
2.1 Equilibrium Allocation under IFA
In setting N, according to equation (7) and (6), the equity-investment ratio is constant
at ψit = η and domestic investment is fully financed by domestic saving K
i
t+1 = Rω
i
t. The
dynamic equation of wages9 is
ωit+1 =
(1− α)
L
Y it+1 =
(
Rωit
ρ
)α
, where ρ ≡ α
1− α. (11)
In setting F, for ωit < m, aggregate saving is not enough to allow all agents to run their
projects. According to equation (7) and (6), the mass of entrepreneurs and the equity-
investment ratio are endogenous, ηit = ψ
i
t =
ωit
m
< 1, and domestic investment is fully
financed by domestic saving. Thus, the phase diagram of wages is the same as in setting
N. For ωit ≥ m, all agents can self-finance their projects, ηit = ψit = 1. Given the fixed
project size, aggregate output of capital goods is constant at Kit+1 = Rm and the phase
diagram of wages is flat at ωit+1 =
(
Rm
ρ
)α
.
Assumption 1. m > ωIFA.
Proposition 1. In both settings, countries with identical fundamentals except for the
initial income levels converge to the same steady state under IFA, which is unique and
stable; for λ ∈ (0, 1 − ψit), the borrowing constraints are binding and there is a wedge
between the social and private rates of return, Γit > Rv
i
t+1 > r
i
t; for λ ∈ (1 − ψit, 1), the
borrowing constraints are slack and Γit = r
i
t = Rv
i
t+1.
In the following analysis, I focus on the case of the binding borrowing constraints. Use
the binding borrowing constraints to rewrite the interest rate as
rit =
λ
1− ψit
vit+1R < v
i
t+1R. (12)
9The model dynamics can also be characterized by the dynamic equation of capital, Kit+1 = Rω
i
t =
R 1−αL Y
i
t = R
(
Kit
ρ
)α
. For α ∈ (0, 1), the phase diagram of capital is globally concave, implying the
existence of a unique and stable steady state under IFA with KIFA = RωIFA. For notational simplicity,
I use the phase diagram of wages to analyze the existence, uniqueness, and stability of the steady state.
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The interest rate depends on three factors, i.e., the social rate of return, vit+1R, the level
of financial development λ, and the equity-investment ratio ψit.
As long as assumption 1 is satisfied, fixed investment size requirement does not matter
for the dynamic properties under IFA. However, it does matter under FMG and the key
is how the interest rate responds to income changes.
Figure 2 shows how a higher labor income affects the credit market equilibrium. For
simplicity, I suppress the country index. The credit market equilibrium is initially at
point E. A higher labor income ω˜t > ωt raises the aggregate investment, leading to a lower
social rate of return, Rv˜t+1 < Rvt+1, due to the concavity of the neoclassical aggregate
production function with respect to capital. It is called the neoclassical effect.
N
tS
tD
tr
tη)w(1
N
tr
~
tw
~η)(1
N
tS
~
tD
~
E
NE
~
t
t1t
r
wλRv 
Setting N 
t
t1t
r
w~v~λR 
F
tS
tD
tt )wη(1
F
tr
~
tt w
~)η~(1
F
tS
~
tD
~
FE
~
Setting F 
E
tr
t
t1t
r
wλRv 
t
t1t
r
w~v~λR 
Figure 2: Income Changes and the Credit Market Adjustment
In setting N, the masses of households and entrepreneurs are fixed at 1 − η and η,
respectively. Thus, a higher labor income affects the credit market only on the intensive
margin. The aggregate credit supply, St = (1− η)ωt, rises proportionally in ωt, while the
aggregate credit demand, Dt = ηdt =
λRvt+1ωt
rt
, rises less-than-proportionally in ωt, due
to the negative neoclassical effect. Thus, the rightward shift of the credit demand curve
is dominated by that of the credit supply curve and hence, the equilibrium moves from
point E to point E˜N with a lower interest rate, r˜Nt < rt. See the left panel of figure 2.
Let ∆ lnXt ≡ ln X˜t− lnXt. Rewrite the credit market equilibrium condition Dt = St,
lnλ+ lnRvt+1 − ln rt + lnωt = lnωt + ln(1− η) (13)
∆ lnRvt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
the neoclassical effect
−∆ ln rt + ∆ lnωt︸ ︷︷ ︸
the wealth effect
= ∆ lnωt︸ ︷︷ ︸
the wealth effect
(14)
∆ ln rt = ∆ lnRvt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
the neoclassical effect
. (15)
With the wealth effects canceling out on both sides, the interest rate responds to income
changes only through the neoclassical effect in setting N.
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Lemma 1. In setting N, the interest rate strictly decreases in ωit under IFA.
In setting F, given the fixed investment size at the individual level, a higher ωt affects
the credit market on the intensive and the extensive margins. First, a rise in ωt reduces
the individual entrepreneur’s credit demand, dt = m − ωt, as well as allows more agents
to become entrepreneurs, ηt =
ωt
m
. The intensive-margin (extensive-margin) effect tends
to reduce (raise) the aggregate credit demand. Overall, the aggregate credit demand
curve shifts to the right at the same magnitude as in setting N, Dt = ηtdt =
λRvt+1ωt
rt
.
Second, a rise in ωt raises the individual household’s saving, while it also reduces the
mass of households, 1− ηt. The intensive-margin (extensive-margin) effect tends to raise
(reduce) the aggregate credit supply, St = (1−ηt)ωt. The positive intensive-margin effect
is identical as in setting N, while the negative extensive-margin effect is new in setting
F. Same as in setting N, the negative neoclassical effect dampens the expansion of the
credit demand; different from setting N, the negative extensive-margin effect dampens
the expansion of the credit supply. If the negative extensive-margin effect dominate the
negative neoclassical effect, the credit market equilibrium moves from point E to point
E˜F with a higher interest rate, r˜Ft > rt. See the right panel of figure 2.
Rewrite the credit market equilibrium condition Dt = St as
lnλ+ lnRvt+1 − ln rt + lnωt = lnωt + ln(1− ηt) (16)
∆ lnRvt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
the neoclassical effect
−∆ ln rt + ∆ lnωt︸ ︷︷ ︸
the wealth effect
= ∆ lnωt︸ ︷︷ ︸
the wealth effect
+ ∆ ln(1− ηt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
the extensive-margin effect
, (17)
∆ ln rt = ∆ lnRvt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
the neoclassical effect
− ∆ ln(1− ηt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
the extensive-margin effect
. (18)
With the wealth effects canceling out on both sides, the interest rate responds to income
changes through the neoclassical effect and the extensive-margin effect in setting F.
Lemma 2. In setting F, the equity-investment ratio ψit =
ωit
m
rises in ωit under IFA; given
λ ∈ (0, 1− ψ˜F ), the interest rate rises in ωit if ψit ∈ (ψ˜F , 1− λ), where ψ˜F ≡ 1−α2−α .
Figure 3 shows the parameter configuration in setting F. According to proposition
1, for (λ, ψit) in region SD, the borrowing constraints are s lack and the interest rate,
coinciding with the social rate of return, declines in ωit, due to the neoclassical effect.
According to lemma 2, for (λ, ψit) in region BI, the borrowing constraints are binding and
the interest rate increases in ωit, as the extensive-margin effect dominates the neoclassical
effect; for (λ, ψit) in region BD, the borrowing constraints are binding and the interest
rate declines in ωit, as the neoclassical effect dominates the extensive-margin effect.
Figure 4 illustrates proposition 1 and lemmas 1-2 graphically. The left panel shows
that the phase diagram of wage starts from zero and is concave crosses the 45◦ line once
from the left in the two settings. Thus, the fixed investment size requirement does not
matter for the existence, uniqueness, and stability of the steady state under IFA. Given
λ < 1− η, the middle panel shows that the interest rate in setting N, proportional to the
9
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Figure 3: Parameter Configuration for the Interest Rate Patterns in Setting F
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Figure 4: Patterns of Wage Rate and Interest Rates under IFA
social rate of return, declines in ωt, due to the neoclassical effect. Given λ < 1− ψ˜F , the
right panel shows that the interest rate in setting F is a non-monotonic function of ωt,
due to the interactions of the neoclassical effect and the extensive-margin effect.
Let us focus on the interest rate response to ωit around the steady state. The equity-
investment ratio in the steady state is ψIFA =
ωIFA
m
= R
ρ
m
1
ρρ
. If ψIFA = ψ
h ∈ (1 − λ, 1)
or ψIFA = ψ
l ∈ (0, ψ˜F ), i.e., in region SD or BD of figure 3, the interest rate declines in
ωt around the steady state; if ψIFA = ψ
m ∈ (ψ˜F , 1− λ), i.e., in region BI of figure 3, the
interest rate rises in ωt around the steady state.
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In setting F, the non-monotonic interest rate response to income changes under IFA
will lead to the non-monotonic patterns of financial capital flows, which is the key mech-
anism behind Matsuyama’s symmetry breaking, as shown in subsection 2.2.
10Note that the assumption of the Cobb-Douglas production function is not essential here. The two
key effects in setting F, i.e., the neoclassical effect and the extensive margin effect, exist as long as the
aggregate production function is neoclassical, i.e., f ′(k) > 0 and f ′′(k) < 0, where k ≡ KL .
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2.2 Equilibrium Allocation under FMG
In this subsection, I analyze whether and under what conditions FMG may destabilize
the steady state under IFA. For that purpose, I assume that all countries are in their
respective steady state under IFA before agents are allowed to borrow or lend globally in
period t = 0. Agents take the world interest rate as given,
r∗t = rIFA =
λ
1− ψIFAρ < ρ, where ψIFA = η (ψIFA =
ωIFA
m
) in setting N (F).
S
wIFA
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wIFAt+1
wFMGt+1
O
Phase Diagram of Wages (Setting N)
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0.2
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wIFA
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Figure 5: Phase Diagram of Wages and Capital Flows under FMG in Setting N
The solid and the dash-dotted curves in the left panel of figure 5 show that the phase
diagrams of wage in setting N are concave and point S is the unique and stable steady
state under IFA and under FMG. For a marginal rise (decline) in ωit around point S,
the interest rate tends to reduce (raise), due to the neoclassical effect, and hence, given
the world interest rate constant at r∗t = rIFA under FMG, financial capital flows out of
(into) country i, dampening the rise (decline) in domestic investment and ωit+1. See the
right panel. Essentially, FMG makes the phase diagram of wage flatter so that countries
converge to the same steady state as under IFA but faster. Although setting N satisfies
the three conditions mentioned in section 7 of Matsuyama (2004), symmetry breaking does
not arise and the key reason is the negative interest rate responses to income changes.
Proposition 2. In setting N, FMG maintains the uniqueness and stability of the steady
state under IFA.
The left panel of figure 6 shows the parameter configuration for five cases in setting F
in the (λ, ψiIFA) space. By rescaling the vertical axis from ψIFA into R = ρ(mψIFA)
1
ρ , the
right panel of figure 6 replicates the same result in the (λ,R) space, corresponding to figure
5 in Matsuyama (2004). For parameters in region C (A), the borrowing constraints are
11
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Figure 6: Parameter Configuration for Symmetry Breaking in Setting F
slack (binding), the steady state under FMG is identical as under IFA, which is unique
and stable. In the following, I focus on region B, AB, and BC where FMG leads to
multiple steady states.11 The right panel of figure 6 is identical as figure 5 of Matsuyama
(2004) except for the boundary between region AB and A. By definition, the mass of
entrepreneurs cannot exceed the total mass of population in each generation, ηit ≤ 1.
Taking that into account, the boundary between region AB and A is characterized by a
piecewise function with two subfunctions.12 This result is confirmed in the generalized
setting in section 3. Thus, there is a technical error in figure 5 of Matsuyama (2004).
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Figure 7: Phase Diagrams of Wage under FMG in Setting F
The solid and the dashed curves in figure 7 show the phase diagrams of wage under
IFA versus under FMG in the three cases.13 As shown in figure 3, for (λ, ψt) in region BI,
11The analysis for region A and C is in the proof of proposition 3 in the appendix.
12See the proof of Proposition 3 in the appendix for the explicit characterization of the two subfunctions.
13The three cases differ only in terms of the fixed investment size, i.e., mBC < mB < mAB , and have
the same steady state (point S) under IFA with ωIFA =
(
R
ρ
)ρ
.
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the interest rate rises in ωit under IFA; under FMG, a marginal rise (decline) in ω
i
t leads
to financial capital inflows (outflows), amplifying the change in domestic investment and
ωit+1. Thus, the phase diagram of wage is convex for ω
i
t below a threshold value.
Let ψˆF ≡ 1 − α > ψ˜F . Consider region B of figure 6. The amplification effect of
FMG is so strong that
∂ωit+1
∂ωit
> 1 at point S. As shown in the left panel of figure 7, FMG
destabilizes the initial steady state and creates two new stable steady states, i.e., point H
with a higher income and point L with a lower income, respectively.
Consider region AB of figure 6. According to figure 3, if ψIFA ∈ (0, ψ˜F ), the interest
rate declines in ωit around point S under IFA; under FMG, financial capital flows tend
to dampen the change in domestic investment, making the phase diagram of wage flatter
around point S so that the initial steady state (point S) is more stable; if ψIFA ∈ (ψ˜F , ψˆF ),
although the interest rate rises in ωit around point S, the amplification effect of FMG is
not strong enough, i.e.,
∂ωit+1
∂ωit
< 1 around point S, so that the initial steady state (point S)
is still stable. However, as shown in the middle panel of figure 7, for ωit  ωIFA, ψit enters
in region BI of figure 3 and FMG generates the sufficiently large amplification effect so
that there exists two other steady states, i.e., point M (unstable) and point H (stable).
Consider region BC of figure 6. The borrowing constraints are slack in the steady
state under IFA; FMG makes the phase diagram of wage flat around point S so that the
initial steady state (point S) is still stable. However, as shown in the right panel of figure
7, for ωit  ωIFA, ωit crosses region BI of figure 3 along the convergence path where the
amplification effect makes the phase diagram of wage convex and there exists two other
steady states, i.e., point M (unstable) and point L (stable).
Proposition 3. In setting F, FMG may lead to multiple steady states.
To sum up, although the initial income level does not matter for the steady state
under IFA, it does matter under FMG. In case B, starting with the income level slightly
higher (lower) than the steady-state one under IFA, a small open economy converges to
a new, stable steady state with the income much higher (lower) than in the steady state
under IFA; in case AB (BC), starting with an income sufficiently higher (lower) than
the steady-state one under IFA, a small open economy converges to a new, stable steady
state with the income much higher (lower) than in the steady state under IFA. This way,
FMG amplifies the cross-country output gap. Technically, Matsuyama (2004)’s symmetry
breaking arises from the convexity of the phase diagram of wage under FMG, which is a
result of the positive and sufficiently large interest rate responses to income changes under
IFA. Thus, one may test the empirical relevance of Matsuyama’s symmetry breaking by
estimating the sign and the size of interest rate responses to income changes.
3 The Generalized Model
The individual project size is exogenous in setting F. I extend setting F in two ways
to allow for the endogenous individual project size and wealth heterogeneity. First, the
13
individual project has a minimum (instead of fixed) investment size requirement m ≥ 0,
as shown in the right panel of figure 1; second, the labor endowment for agent j ∈ [0, 1] is
individual specific, lj =
θ+1
θ
1
j
, where j ∈ (1,∞) follows the Pareto distribution with the
cumulative distribution function F (j) = 1− −θj and θ > 1. The aggregate labor input is
L =
∫∞
1
ljdF (j) = 1. With minimum investment requirement, it is called setting M.
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Given agent j’s labor income nij,t = ω
i
tlj = ω
i
t
θ+1
θ
1
j
and the borrowing constraints as
specified by equation (3), its maximum investment size is mij,t =
nij,t
1−λRv
i
t+1
rit
=
ωit
1−λRv
i
t+1
rit
θ+1
θ
1
j
.
For a high m and/or a low ωit, the labor income of agents with j > 
i
t is so low that they
cannot meet the minimum investment size requirement, mij,t < m, and hence, they become
households and lend out the labor income; agents with j ∈ (1, it] can meet the minimum
investment size requirement, mij,t ≥ m, and they become entrepreneurs. The mass of
entrepreneurs is ηit = 1 − (it)−θ. In equilibrium, if the cutoff value it is sufficiently low,
the mass of households 1 − ηit = (it)−θ is large and the relatively high aggregate credit
supply depresses the interest rate, rit < Rv
i
t+1. In this case, entrepreneurs borrow to the
limit and the equity-investment ratio is identical among them,
ψij,t =
nij,t
mij,t
= 1− λRv
i
t+1
rit
= ψit =
ωit
m
1
it
θ + 1
θ
. (19)
The condition for the binding borrowing constraints is the same as in setting F. See
proposition 1. In the following, I focus on the case of the binding borrowing constraints.
Under IFA, domestic investment is financed by domestic saving,
Kit+1 = R
∫ it
1
mij,tdF (j) = Rω
i
t ⇒ (it)−(1+θ) = λ
Rvit+1
rit
, (20)
and the output dynamics is characterized by equation (11). The steady-state properties
are independent of λ and m. See proposition 1.
Lemma 3. The equity-investment ratio ψit and the cutoff value 
i
t rise monotonically in
the wage rate ωit under IFA.
A rise in the wage rate affects aggregate investment on the extensive and the intensive
margins. First, it allows more agents to become entrepreneurs and start the projects
with leveraged investment and hence, the cutoff value it is higher; second, the higher
aggregate investment reduces the marginal rate of return and the decline in the mass of
households tends to reduce the credit supply, which tightens the borrowing constraints
for entrepreneurs and raises the equity-investment ratio. Given the mass of entrepreneurs
ηit = 1− (it)−θ, equation (20) can be rewritten as,
14Setting F is a special case here, i.e., for θ → ∞, the distribution of labor endowment degenerates
into a unit mass at j = 1 and hence, lj = 1.
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rit = λRv
i
t+1(
i
t)
1+θ = λRvit+1(1− ηit)−
1+θ
θ (21)
ln rit = lnλ+ lnRv
i
t+1 − (
1
θ
+ 1) ln(1− ηit). (22)
∆ ln rit = ∆ lnRv
i
t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
the neoclassical effect
− (1
θ
+ 1)∆ ln(1− ηit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
the extensive-margin effect
(23)
Same as equation (18) in setting F, income changes affect the interest rate through the
neoclassical effect and the extensive-margin effect. In particular, for θ → ∞, equation
(23) coincides with (18). Let ψ˜M ≡ 1−α2−α− 1−α
1+θ
> ψ˜F .
Lemma 4. Given λ ∈ (0, 1− ψ˜M), the interest rate rises in ωit if ψit ∈ (ψ˜M , 1− λ).
Figure 8 shows the region where the interest rate responds positively or negatively to
income changes in the (λ, ψit) space, qualitatively identical as figure 3 for setting F. For
θ →∞, limθ→∞ ψ˜M = ψ˜F and lemma 4 is identical as lemma 2.
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Figure 8: Parameter Configuration for the Interest Rate Patterns in Setting M
Agents save the labor income when young and consume the financial income when old,
ci,hj,t+1 = r
i
tω
i
tlj, and c
i,e
j,t+1 = Γ
i
tω
i
tlj. (24)
Definition 3. A market equilibrium under IFA is a set of allocations of households, {ci,hj,t},
entrepreneurs, {mij,t, ci,ej,t}, and aggregate variables, {Y it , Kit , ωit, vit,Γit, rit, it, ψit}, satisfying
equations (1)-(4), (19)-(20), and (24).
Under FMG, the equilibrium conditions are identical as under IFA except for the credit
market clearing condition at the country and at the world level,
15
Kit+1 = R
∫ it
1
mij,tdF (j) = R(ω
i
t − Φit), (25)∫ 1
0
Φitdi = 0. (26)
Definition 4. A market equilibrium under FMG is a set of allocations of households,
{ci,hj,t}, entrepreneurs, {mij,t, ci,ej,t}, and aggregate variables, {Y it , Kit , ωit, vit,Γit, rit, it, ψit,Φit},
satisfying equations (1)-(4), (19), (24), and (25). The world interest rate r∗t is determined
by the world credit market equilibrium condition (26).
Following the analysis in subsection 2.2, I assume that the world economy is initially
in the steady state under IFA with the interest rate constant at r∗t = rIFA =
λ
1−ψIFAρ,
before agents are allowed to borrow and lend globally in period t = 0.
Proposition 4. In setting M, FCM may lead to multiple steady states.
Figure 9 shows the parameter configuration for five cases in the (λ, ψiIFA) space. As
shown analytically in the proof of proposition 4 in the appendix, for θ →∞, the respective
boundaries of the five regions converge to those in the left panel of figure 6.
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Figure 9: Parameter Configuration for Symmetry Breaking in Setting M
Figure 10 shows the phase diagrams of wage under IFA versus under FMG in the
three cases of symmetry breaking, qualitatively the same as figure 7 in setting F. As
shown in the proof of proposition 3, the phase diagram of wage in setting F consists of
two subfunctions, i.e., a convex part due to the positive interest rate response to income
changes, and a flat part due to the profitability constraints Rvir+1 ≥ r∗t or the upper limit
for the mass of entrepreneurs ηit ≤ 1. As a result, Matsuyama (2004) shows that in the case
of symmetry breaking, the borrowing constraints are strictly binding (slack) in the poor
16
(rich) country so that, under FMG, the equity premium is always zero, Γit = r
i
t = Rv
i
t+1,
in the rich country. As shown in the proof of proposition 4, the phase diagram of wage in
setting M may consist of three subfunctions, i.e., a convex part, a concave part and a flat
part. Thus, in the case of symmetry breaking, the borrowing constraints can be strictly
binding in the poor and in the rich country so that, under FMG, the equity premium can
still be positive Γit > Rv
i
t+1 > r
i
t, in the rich country but smaller than in the poor country.
Thus, one can test empirically the tightness of the borrowing constraints by estimating
the spread between the equity rate and the interest rate across countries.
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Figure 10: Phase Diagrams of Wage under FMG in Setting M
To sum up, financial frictions and minimum (instead of fixed) investment size require-
ment are key to the positive interest rate response to income changes which essentially
underpins Matsuyama’s symmetry breaking. Furthermore, I prove formally that the sym-
metry breaking results still hold in the presence of wealth inequality and endogenous
project size, confirming Matsuyama’s conjectures in subsection 7.1 and 7.2.
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A Appendix
A.1 Endogenize the Mass of Entrepreneurs in Setting N
The mass of entrepreneurs is exogenous in setting N. Here, I endogenize it by assuming
that all agents can produce capital goods using final goods and the productivity for agent
j ∈ [0, 1] is individual specific,
kij,t+1 = Rjm
i
j,t, and Rj =
θ + 1
θ
R
j
(27)
where j ∈ (1,∞) follows the Pareto distribution with the cumulative distribution function
F (j) = 1− −θj and θ > 1. Rj ∈ (0, R¯) has the mean E(R) =
∫∞
1
RjdF (j) = R and the
upperbound R¯ ≡ 1+θ
θ
R. With productivity heterogeneity, it is called setting P.15
Let it ≡ θ+1θ
Rvit+1
rit
. The profitability constraint, Rjv
i
t+1 ≥ rit, implies that the agents
with j ∈ (1, it] choose to become entrepreneurs and finance their projects with loans,
while the agents with j > 
i
t choose to become households and lend out the labor income.
This way, the mass of entrepreneurs ηit = 1− (it)−θ is endogenized.
Suppose that the borrowing constraints are binding for all entrepreneurs. The project
investment size rises in the individual-specific productivity, mij,t =
ωit
1−λRjv
i
t+1
rit
=
ωit
1−λ 
i
t
j
.
Under IFA, aggregate investment is financed purely by domestic saving,∫ it
1
mij,tdF (j) = ωt
∫ it
1
1
1− λ it
j
dF (j) = ω
i
t ⇒
∫ it
1
1
1− λ it
j
dF (j) = 1, (28)
implying that the cutoff value is time invariant it = IFA and depends only on the level
of financial development λ and the distribution function F (j).
Aggregate output of capital goods is
Kit+1 =
∫ it
1
Rjm
i
j,tdF (j) = ωtRIFA, where RIFA ≡
∫ it
1
θ+1
θ
1
j
1− λ it
j
dF (j). (29)
15Setting N is a special case here, i.e., for θ → ∞, the distribution of j degenerates into a unit mass
at j = 1 and hence, Rj = 1.
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RIFA ∈ (R, R¯) measures the aggregate productivity under IFA and is time invariant. The
dynamics of aggregate output can be characterized by
ωit+1 =
(1− α)
L
Y it+1 =
(
RIFAω
i
t
ρ
)α
, (30)
and there exists a unique and stable steady state with ωIFA =
(
RIFA
ρ
)ρ
, similar as equation
(11) in setting N.
Agent j can get the loan λ
Rjv
i
t+1
rit
= λ
IFA
j
per unit of its project investment. As long
as λIFA < 1, even the most productive agents j = 1 cannot finance their entire project
investment by loans and hence, the borrowing constraints are binding for all entrepreneurs.
In equilibrium, the interest rate is determined by the rate of return of the marginal
entrepreneurs with j = IFA,
rit = Rv
i
t+1 =
θ + 1
θ
Rvit+1
IFA
=
θ + 1
θ
R
IFA
(
ρ
RIFAωit
)1−α
. (31)
Lemma 5. For λ ∈ (0, 1
IFA
), the borrowing constraints are binding. The interest rate,
proportional to the price of capital goods, decreases in ωit.
Intuitively, although the mass of entrepreneurs ηit = 1 − (it)−θ is endogenously de-
termined, the time-invariant cutoff value it = IFA implies the time-invariant mass of
entrepreneurs in equilibrium under IFA. Thus, income changes only affect the credit mar-
ket on the intensive margin, same as in setting N. Due to the absence of extensive-margin
effect, the neoclassical effect leads to the negative interest rate response to income changes
under IFA; FMG makes the phase diagram of wage flatter and the initial steady state
under IFA is still the unique and stable steady state under FMG.
To sum up, with no fixed or minimum investment size requirements, FMG does not
lead to Matsuyama’s symmetry breaking in setting P as well as in setting N.
A.2 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. According to equation (11), the phase diagram of wage in setting N starts from
zero and is strictly concave, given α ∈ (0, 1). As shown in the left panel of figure 4, it
crosses the 45◦ line once and only once from the left with the wage at ωIFA =
(
R
ρ
)ρ
.
Given assumption 1, the phase diagram of wage in setting F is identical as in setting N,
except for a kink at ωt = m. Thus, there exists a unique and stable steady state under
IFA in both settings.
Rewrite the binding borrowing constraints (12) as
rit
vit+1R
=
λ
1− ψit
. (32)
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According to equation (4), entrepreneurs prefer to finance their investment using loans iff
rit < v
i
t+1R, or equivalent, λ < 1 − ψit. In setting N, the credit market clearing equation
(7) implies that ψit =
ωit
mit
= η. Thus, for λ ∈ (0, 1 − η), the private rates of return
are proportional to the social rate of return, rit =
λ
1−ηRv
i
t+1 < Rv
i
t+1 < Γ
i
t =
1−λ
η
Rvit+1;
for λ = 1 − η, the private rates of return coincide with the social rate of return, rit =
Γit = Rv
i
t+1, and the borrowing constraints are weakly binding; for λ ∈ (1 − η, 1), the
borrowing constraints are slack and entrepreneurs do not borrow to the limit, because
rit = Γ
i
t = Rv
i
t+1. Similar analysis applies to setting F.
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. According to equation (1)-(2),
vit+1 =
(
Kit+1
ρ
)α−1
=
(
Rωit
ρ
)α−1
=
ρ
R
(
ωIFA
ωit
)1−α
. (33)
According to the proof of proposition 1, for λ ∈ (0, 1− η), the borrowing constraints are
binding and rit =
λ
1−ηRv
i
t+1 =
λρ
1−η
(
ωIFA
ωit
)1−α
; for λ ∈ (1− η, 1), the borrowing constraints
are slack and rit = Rv
i
t+1 = ρ
(
ωIFA
ωit
)1−α
under IFA. Due to the neoclassical effect, the
social rate of return Rvit+1 declines in ω
i
t and so does the interest rate,
∂rit
∂ωit
< 0.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. According to proposition 1, for λ ∈ (0, 1 − ψit), the borrowing constraints are
binding under IFA. Combine the borrowing constraints (3) and equation (33) to get
rit =
λ
1− ψit
Rvit+1 =
λρ
1− ψit
(
ωIFA
ψitm
)1−α
(34)
∂rit
∂ωit
=
∂ ln rit
∂ψit
∂ψit
∂ωit
rit = (
1
1− ψit
− 1− α
ψit
)
rit
m
> 0, iff ψit ∈ (ψ˜F , 1− λ). (35)
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Combining equations (1)-(2) with the binding borrowing constraints (3), I derive
the phase diagram of wage in setting N and its properties are as follows,
r∗t (m
i
t − ωit) = λvit+1Rmit ⇒ r∗t
[ ρ
R
(ωit+1)
1
α − ηωit
]
= λρωit+1, (36)
∂ωit+1
∂ωit
=
η
ρ
[
(ωit+1)
1
ρ
αR
− λ
r∗t
]−1
=
ηvit+1R
1 +
ρωit
mit
> 0, (37)
∂2ωit+1
∂(ωit)
2
= −
(
∂ωit+1
∂ωit
)3
(ωit+1)
1
ρ
−1
ηαR
< 0. (38)
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Given the world interest rate r∗t , equation (36) implies that, for ω
i
t → 0, the phase diagram
of wage has a positive intercept on the vertical axis at ωit+1 =
(
Rλ
r∗t
)ρ
. Define a threshold
value ω¯Nt =
ρ
r∗t
1−λ
η
( R
r∗t
)ρ. For ωit ∈ (0, ω¯Nt ), the borrowing constraints are binding and the
phase diagram of wage is increasing and concave, according to equations (37)-(38). For
ωit > ω¯
N
t , aggregate saving and investment are so high that the social rate of return is
equal to the world interest rate, Rvit+1 = r
∗
t and the borrowing constraints are slack. The
phase diagram is flat at ωit+1 = ω¯
N
t+1 = (
R
r∗t
)ρ. Given r∗t < ρ and (1 − λ) > η, ω¯Nt+1 < ω¯Nt
so that the kink point on the phase diagram is below the 45◦ line. Graphically, the phase
diagram of wage crosses the 45◦ line once and only once from the left, and the intersection
is in its concave part. Given r∗t = rIFA, the steady state coincides with the one under IFA
at ωFMG = ωIFA =
(
R
ρ
)ρ
. See the left panel of figure 5.
Use equation (11) and (37) to evaluate the slope of the phase diagram at the steady
state under IFA and under FMG,
∂ωit+1
∂ωit
|FMG = α
1+
(1−α)(1−η)
η
< α =
∂ωit+1
∂ωit
|IFA. Thus, FMG
makes the phase diagram of wage flatter than under IFA, which speeds up the convergence
to the same steady state as under IFA.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. I first prove the shape of the phase diagram of wage and then describe the condi-
tions for symmetry breaking.
For Rvit+1 > r
∗
t or equivalently ψ
i
t < 1−λ, the borrowing constraints are binding. Use
equations (1)-(2) to rewrite the binding borrowing constraints (3) as
1− ω
i
t
m
= λ
vit+1R
r∗t
=
λρ
r∗t
(
ωIFA
ωit+1
) 1
ρ
, (39)
∂ωit+1
∂ωit
=
ρ
1
ψit
− 1
ωit+1
ωit
> 0, and
∂2ωit+1
∂(ωit)
2
=
(
∂ωit+1
∂ωit
)2
1
αωit+1ω
i
t
> 0. (40)
Combine equation (39) with (1)-(2) and then compute the mass of entrepreneurs,
ωit+1 = ωIFA
[
λρ
r∗t (1− ψit)
]ρ
⇒ ηit =
Kit+1
Rm
=
ρ(ωit+1)
1
α
Rm
= ψIFA
[
λρ
r∗t (1− ψit)
] 1
1−α
. (41)
The mass of entrepreneurs cannot exceed the population size of each generation, ηit ≤ 1.
For ψIFA ∈ (0, 1 − λ), the borrowing constraints are binding in the steady state under
IFA and r∗t =
λρ
1−ψIFA < ρ; under FMG, according to equation (41), η
i
t ≤ 1 implies that
ψit ≤ ψˇFt ≡ 1− ψ1−αIFA(1− ψIFA). For ψIFA > 1− λ, the borrowing constraints are slack in
the steady state under IFA and r∗t = ρ; under FMG, according to equation (41), η
i
t ≤ 1
implies that ψit ≤ 1−λψ1−αIFA. Thus, the phase diagram of wage under FMG is a piecewise
function with two subfunctions and there are two cases.
• Case 1: if ψˇFt > 1− λ,
For ψit ∈ (0, 1− λ), the borrowing constraints are binding, some agents become en-
trepreneurs, ηit < 1, and the phase diagram of wage is convex, ω
i
t+1 = ωIFA
[
1−ψIFA
1−ω
i
t
m
]ρ
;
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for ψit > 1 − λ, the borrowing constraints are slack, some agents become en-
trepreneurs, ηit < 1, and the phase diagram of wage is flat at ω
i
t+1 = ωIFA
[
1−ψIFA
λ
]ρ
.
• Case 2: if ψˇFt < 1− λ,
For ψit ∈ (0, ψˇFt ), the borrowing constraints are binding, some agents become en-
trepreneurs, ηit < 1, and the phase diagram of wage is convex, ω
i
t+1 = ωIFA
[
1−ψIFA
1−ω
i
t
m
]ρ
;
for ψit > ψˇ
F
t , the borrowing constraints are binding, all agents become entrepreneurs,
ηit = 1, and the phase diagram of wage is flat at ω
i
t+1 =
(
Rm
ρ
)α
= ωIFA
ψαIFA
.
According to equation (41), for ωit → 0, ψit → 0 and the phase diagram has a positive
intercept on the vertical axis at ωit+1 = ωIFA
(
λρ
r∗t
)ρ
. The convex part of the phase diagram
creates the possibility of multiple steady states.
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Figure 11: Phase Diagrams of Wage under FMG in Setting F
Figure 6 shows the parameter configuration of five regions in the {λ, ψIFA} space.
Besides the three symmetry-breaking cases shown in figure 7, figure 11 shows two cases
where the steady state under IFA is still the unique, stable steady state under FMG.
In the following, I derive the boundary conditions for the five regions in figure 6. Given
r∗t = rIFA, the steady state under IFA is still a steady state under FMG, though it may
not be stable or unique. For the parameters in the lower-left (upper-right) triangle of
figure 6, the borrowing constraints are binding (slack) around the steady state under IFA.
Start with the upper-right triangle of figure 6, i.e., ψIFA ∈ (1 − λ, 1). Compare the
right panel of figure 7 and the left panel of figure 11. Given r∗t = rIFA = ρ, the phase
diagram of wage under FMG is flat at the initial steady state (point S); the boundary
between region BC and C is defined as the case where the convex part of the phase
diagram of wage is tangent with the 45◦ line, i.e., ωit = ω
i
t+1 = ω
F < ωIFA. Rewrite
equations (39) and (40) at the tangent point,
1− ω
F
m
= λ(ωF )−
1
ρ
R
ρ
, ⇒
(
1− ω
F
m
)(
ωF
m
) 1
ρ
= ψ
1
ρ
IFAλ (42)
∂ωit+1
∂ωit
=
ρψF
1− ψF =
ρρ
λRm
(wF )
1
α = 1, ⇒
(
ωF
m
) 1
α
=
λ
ρ
ψ
1
ρ
IFA. (43)
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Combine them to get
ωF
m
= 1− α and ψIFA = (1− α)
(α
λ
)ρ
, (44)
ωF < ωIFA ⇒ ω
F
m
< ψIFA and λ < α. (45)
Equations (44)-(45) jointly define the boundary between region BC and C.
Consider the lower-left triangular of figure 6, i.e., ψIFA ∈ (0, 1 − λ). Case B arises
if the slope of the phase diagram of wage under FMG is larger than unity at the initial
steady state,
∂ωit+1
∂ωit
|FMG = ρ1
ψIFA
− 1 > 1 ⇒ ψIFA > ψˆF ≡ 1− α, (46)
which specifies the boundary between region B and AB.
If
∂ωit+1
∂ωit
|FMG < 1, the initial steady state is locally stable. However, FMG may still
generate a multiple steady-state equilibrium if the kink point of the phase diagram of
wage is above the 45◦ line, i.e., ω¯Ft+1 > ω¯
F
t . There are two cases.
• Case 1: if ψˇFt > 1−λ, the kink point is at ω¯Ft = (1−λ)m and ω¯Ft+1 = ωIFA
(
1−ψIFA
λ
)ρ
.
ω¯Ft+1 > ω¯
F
t , ⇔ (1− ψIFA)ρψIFA > (1− λ)λρ. (47)
• Case 2: if ψˇFt < 1 − λ, the kink point is at ω¯Ft = [1 − (1 − ψIFA)ψ1−αIFA]m and
ω¯Ft+1 =
ωIFA
ψαIFA
.
ω¯Ft+1 > ω¯
F
t , ⇔ ψ1−αIFA(2− ψIFA) ≥ 1. (48)
Equations (47) and (48) define the boundary conditions between AB and A.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Combining equations (19) and (20), the cutoff value it is the solution to equation
(49) and the equity-investment ratio ψit is an increasing function of the cutoff value,
it −
1
(it)
θ
=
ωit
m
θ + 1
θ
, ⇒ ∂ ln 
i
t
∂ lnωit
=
1− (it)−(1+θ)
1 + θ(it)
−(1+θ) = 1−
1 + θ
1
1−ψit + θ
∈ (0, 1), (49)
ψit = 1− (it)−(1+θ), ⇒
∂ lnψit
∂ lnωit
= 1− ∂ ln 
i
t
∂ lnωit
=
1 + θ
1
1−ψit + θ
∈ (0, 1). (50)
Proof of Lemma 4
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Proof. Combine equations (1) and (2) with equation (20) to rewrite the interest rate as
rit = λRv
i
t+1(
i
t)
1+θ = λρ
(
ωiIFA
ωit
)1−α
(it)
1+θ, (51)
ln rit = lnλρ+ (1− α) lnωiIFA − (1− α) lnωit + (1 + θ) ln i, (52)
∂ ln rit
∂ lnωit
= −(1− α) + (1 + θ) ∂ ln 
i
t
∂ lnωit
= −(1− α) + (1 + θ) ψ
i
t
1 + θ(1− ψit)
. (53)
For λ ∈ (0, 1− ψ˜M), the interest rate rises in ωit, ∂ ln r
i
t
∂ lnωit
> 0, if ψit ∈ (ψ˜M , 1− λ).
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. The structure of the proof resembles that of Proposition 3. I first prove the shape
of the phase diagram of wage and then describe the conditions for symmetry breaking.
For Rvit+1 > r
∗
t or equivalently ψ
i
t < 1− λ, the borrowing constraints are binding and
the model dynamics under FMG are featured by a recursive equation system of {ωit, ψit, it},
ψit
i
t
ωit
=
1 + θ
θm
=
ψIFAIFA
ωIFA
, ⇒ ωit = ωIFA
ψit
i
t
ψIFAIFA
, (54)
1− ψit = λ
Rvit+1
r∗t
, ⇒ ωit+1 = ωIFA
[
λρ
(1− ψit)r∗t
]ρ
. (55)
ωit[1− (it)−(1+θ)]
ψit
=
Kit+1
R
, ⇒ 
i
t[1− (it)−(θ+1)]
ψIFAIFA
=
[
λρ
(1− ψit)r∗t
] 1
1−α
, (56)
Equation (54) specifies the equity-investment ratio, as equation (19); equation (55) fea-
tures the binding borrowing constraints, as equation (12); equation (56) shows that en-
trepreneurs produce capital goods with leveraged investment, as equation (25). Use equa-
tions (54)-(56) to derive the dynamic property of the phase diagram of wage under FMG,
∂ ln it
∂ lnψit
=
1
1− α
ψit
1− ψit
1− (it)−(1+θ)
1 + θ(it)
−(1+θ) > 0, (57)
∂ lnωit
∂ lnψit
=
∂ ln it
∂ lnψit
+ 1 =
1
1− α
ψit
1− ψit
1− (it)−(1+θ)
1 + θ(it)
−(1+θ) + 1 > 1, (58)
∂ lnωit+1
∂ lnψit
=
α
1− α
ψit
1− ψit
> 0 (59)
⇒ ∂ω
i
t+1
∂ωit
=
ωit+1
ωit
∂ lnωit+1
∂ lnψit
∂ lnωit
∂ lnψit
=
ωit+1
ωit
α
1−(it)−(1+θ)
1+θ(it)
−(1+θ) + (1− α)1−ψ
i
t
ψit
> 0. (60)
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Let At ≡ 1−(
i
t)
−(1+θ)
1+θ(it)
−(1+θ) and Zt ≡ 1− ψit − At(1−At) −
ψitθ
(1−α)A
2
t
∂At
∂ψit
=
[
1 + θ
1 + θ(it)
−(1+θ)
]2
(it)
−(1+θ)
ψit
∂ ln it
∂ lnψit
> 0 (61)
∂Zt
∂ψit
= −1− θA
2
t
1− α −
∂Ait
∂ψit
[
1
(1−A)2 +
2θψitAt
1− α
]
< 0, (62)
∂2ωit+1
(∂ωit)
2
= Zt
1
ψitαω
i
t+1
1−At
At
1−α +
1−ψit
ψit
(
∂ωit+1
∂ωit
)2
⇒ sgn
(
∂ωit+1
∂2ωit
)
= sgn(Zt). (63)
It is trivial to prove that for ψit → 0, Zt > 0 and the phase diagram of wage is convex.
According to equation (62), Zt declines in ψ
i
t and hence, it is possible that Zt < 0 and the
phase diagram of wage becomes concave. Let ψˇMt define the threshold value of ψ
i
t such
that Zt = 0, i.e., the inflection point of the phase diagram of wage. There are two cases.
• Case 1: if ψˇMt > 1− λ, the phase diagram of wage is a piecewise function with two
subfunctions:
for ψit ∈ (0, 1−λ), the borrowing constraints are binding, the mass of entrepreneurs
is significantly smaller than one, and the phase diagram of wage is convex;
for ψit ∈ (1− λ, 1), the borrowing constraints are slack, the mass of entrepreneurs is
significantly smaller than one, and the phase diagram of wage is flat.
• Case 2: if ψˇMt < 1−λ, the phase diagram of wage is a piecewise function with three
subfunctions:
for ψit ∈ (0, ψˇMt ), the borrowing constraints are binding, the mass of entrepreneurs
is significantly smaller than one, and the phase diagram of wage is convex;
for ψit ∈ (ψˇMt , 1−λ), the borrowing constraints are binding, the mass of entrepreneurs
is close to one, and the phase diagram of wage is concave;
for ψit ∈ (1− λ, 1), the borrowing constraints are slack, the mass of entrepreneurs is
close to one, and the phase diagram of wage is flat.
Given the world interest rate r∗t , equation (56) implies that, for ω
i
t → 0 or equiv-
alently ψit → 0, the phase diagram has a positive intercept on the vertical axis at
ωit+1 = ωIFA
(
λρ
r∗t
)ρ
; for ψit = 1 − λ, the phase diagram of wage has a kink point with
ωit+1 = ωIFA
(
ρ
r∗t
)ρ
. The convex/concave part of the phase diagram of wage creates the
possibility of multiple steady states.16
16Although the shape of the phase diagram of wage under FMG in setting M may differ from that
in setting F, they are fundamentally identical. In setting M, for a sufficiently low level of income, the
equity-investment ratio is low and so is the cutoff value it, according to equations (57)-(58). Thus, the
mass of entrepreneurs ηit = 1− (it)−θ is very small. Capital accumulation raises the wage rate and allows
more individuals to become entrepreneurs. The extensive-margin effect amplifies the rise in domestic
investment and income, which makes the phase diagram of wage convex under FMG. For a sufficiently
high level of income, the mass of entrepreneurs is close to one and a marginal rise in the wage rate
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Figure 9 shows the parameter configuration of five regions in the {λ, ψIFA} space.
Besides the three symmetry-breaking cases shown in figure 10, figure 12 shows two cases
where the steady state under IFA is still the unique, stable steady state under FMG.
S
w
IFA
w
t
w
t+1
O
Case C
S
w
IFA
w
tO
w
t+1
Case A
Figure 12: Phase Diagrams of Wage under FMG in Setting M
In the following, I derive the boundary conditions for the five regions in figure 9. Given
r∗t = rIFA, the steady state under IFA is still a steady state under FMG, though it may
not be stable and unique. For the parameters in the lower-left (upper-right) triangle of
figure 9, the borrowing constraints are binding (slack) around the steady state of IFA.
Start with the upper-right triangle of figure 9, i.e., ψIFA ∈ (1 − λ, 1). Compare the
right panel of figure 10 and the left panel of figure 12. Given r∗t = rIFA = ρ, the phase
diagram of wage under FMG is flat at the initial steady state (point S); the boundary
between region BC and C is defined as the case where the convex part of the phase
diagram of wage is tangent with the 45◦ line, i.e., ωit = ω
i
t+1 = ω
M < ωIFA. Combine
equations (54)-(56) and evaluate equation (60) at the tangent point with r∗t = rIFA = ρ{
it[1− (it)−(1+θ)]
IFAψIFA
}1−α
=
λ
1− ψt =
(
ψit
i
t
ψIFAIFA
) 1−α
α
, (64)
⇒ 1− (it)−(1+θ) = Dt ≡ λ
ψit
1− ψit
, and 0 < Dt < ψ
i
t < ψIFA < 1, (65)
∂ωit+1
∂ωit
=
ωit+1
ωit
α
Dt
1+θ(1−Dt) + (1− α) λDt
= 1 (66)
⇒ ( 1
αθ
+ 1)D2t − [
λ
ρ
+ (
1
θ
+ 1)]Dt +
λ
ρ
(1 +
1
θ
) = 0. (67)
and the labor income cannot raise the mass of entrepreneurs very much so that the neoclassical effect
dominates the extensive-margin effect and hence, the phase diagram is concave. In setting F, for the
sufficiently low level of income, the small mass of entrepreneurs allows for the strong extensive-margin
effect, explaining the convexity of the phase diagram of wage; for a sufficiently high level of income,
the mass of entrepreneurs reaches one and, due to the fixed investment size requirement of individual
projects, any further rise in income does not raise domestic investment and future income so that the
phase diagram of wage becomes flat. In this sense, the threshold value ψˇMt in setting M corresponds to
ψˇFt in setting F.
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As a root of equation (67), Dt is a function of λ. Combine it with equation (65) to solve
for ψit and 
i
t. Then, plug ψ
i
t and 
i
t in equation (64) to solve for ψIFA as the function of
λ, which defines the boundary between region BC and C.17
For θ →∞, equation (67) has two roots, i.e., Dt = 1 and Dt = λρ . As Dt = 1 violates
the condition of Dt < ψ
i
t < 1, the only solution is Dt =
λ
ρ
. Use equation (65) to get
ψit = 1 − α. For θ → ∞, it = (1−Dt)−
1
1+θ → 1 and IFA = (1 − ψIFA)−
1
1+θ → 1.
Inserting them in equation (64), one get the result identical as equation (44) for setting
F.
Now, consider the lower-left triangular of figure 9, i.e., ψIFA ∈ (0, 1 − λ). According
to equation (50), 
−(1+θ)
IFA = 1 − ψIFA. Case B arises if the slope of the phase diagram
of wage is larger than unity under FMG at the initial steady state, ωit+1 = ω
i
t = ωIFA.
Rewrite equation (60) as
∂ωit+1
∂ωit
|FMG= αψIFA
1+θ(1−ψIFA) + (1− α)
1−ψIFA
ψIFA
> 1. (68)
⇒ (1 + 1
θ
)ψ2IFA − [(2− α) +
1
θ
]ψIFA + (1− α)(1 + 1
θ
) < 0, (69)
⇒ ψIFA ∈ (ψˆ−IFA, ψˆ+IFA), where (70)
ψˆ−IFA =
(2− α) + 1
θ
−
√
[(2− α) + 1
θ
]2 − 4(1− α)(1 + 1
θ
)2
2(1 + 1
θ
)
, and (71)
ψˆ+IFA =
(2− α) + 1
θ
+
√
[(2− α) + 1
θ
]2 − 4(1− α)(1 + 1
θ
)2
2(1 + 1
θ
)
. (72)
Equations (70)-(72) and λ ∈ (0, 1− ψIFA) define the boundary of region B. For θ →∞,
limθ→∞ ψˆ+IFA = 1 and limθ→∞ ψˆ
−
IFA = 1− α coincide with equation (46) for setting F.
Consider the region of ψIFA < ψˆ
−
IFA. As the slope of the phase diagram of wage at the
initial steady state is smaller than one under FMG, the initial steady state under IFA is
still a stable steady state under FMG. However, FMG may create multiple steady states
in either one of the two cases as follows.
• Case 1: the kink point of the phase diagram of wage is above the 45◦ line, i.e., given
r∗t =
λρ
1−ψIFA and ψ
i
t = 1− λ, ω¯it+1 > ω¯it. According to equations (54)-(56),
it[1− (it)−(θ+1)]
ψIFAIFA
=
(
1− ψIFA
λ
) 1
1−α
,
(1− λ)it
ψIFAIFA
<
(
1− ψIFA
λ
)ρ
. (73)
⇒ it <
[
1− (1− ψIFA)(1− λ)
λ
]− 1
1+θ
. (74)
Combine equations (73)-(74) to get,
(1− ψIFA)ρψIFA
(
1
1− ψIFA −
1− λ
λ
) 1
1+θ
> (1− λ)λρ, (75)
17Equation (67) is a quadratic function of Dt and there are two roots for Dt. However, only one root
satisfies the condition of Dt < ψ
i
t < ψIFA.
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which specifies ψIFA as a function of λ and is the upward-sloping part of the bound-
ary between region AB and A. For θ → ∞, equation (75) degenerates into the
condition same as equation (47) for setting F.
• Case 2: the concave part of the phase diagram of wage is tangent with the 45◦ line,18
i.e., given r∗t = rIFA =
λρ
1−ψIFA , ω
i
t = ω
i
t+1 = ω
M > ωIFA and
∂ωit+1
∂ωit
= 1. Combine
these conditions with equations (54)-(56) to get{
it[1− (it)−(1+θ)]
IFAψIFA
}1−α
=
1− ψIFA
1− ψt =
(
ψit
i
t
ψIFAIFA
) 1−α
α
, (76)
⇒ 1− (it)−(1+θ) = Dt ≡ (1− ψIFA)
ψit
1− ψit
, and ψIFA < ψ
i
t < Dt ≤ 1, (77)
∂ωit+1
∂ωit
=
α
Dt
1+θ(1−Dt) + (1− α)
1−ψIFA
Dt
= 1 (78)
⇒ ( 1
αθ
+ 1)D2t − [
1− ψIFA
ρ
+ (
1
θ
+ 1)]D+
1− ψIFA
ρ
(1 +
1
θ
) = 0. (79)
As a root of equation (79), Dt is independent of λ. Combine it with equation (77)
to solve for ψit and 
i
t. Then, plug ψ
i
t and 
i
t in equation (76) to solve for ψIFA.
Independent of λ, the threshold value ψIFA is the flat part of the boundary between
region AB and A.19
For θ → ∞, equation (79) has two roots, i.e., Dt = 1 and Dt = 1−ψIFAρ . Combine
Dt =
1−ψIFA
ρ
with equation (77) to get ψit = 1− α. Then, plug it back in equation
(76) to get ψIFA = 1 − α, which violates the condition of ψIFA < ψit. Thus, the
solution should be Dt = 1. Combine it with equation (77) to get ψ
i
t =
1
2−ψIFA . For
θ →∞, it = (1−Dt)−
1
1+θ → 1 and IFA = (1− ψIFA)−
1
1+θ → 1. Inserting them in
equation (76), one get the result identical as equation (44) for setting F.
To sum up, the boundary conditions for the five regions of figure 9 in setting M converge
to those of figure 6 in setting F, if θ →∞.
18The analysis is almost the same as deriving the boundary condition of region BC and C, except for
r∗t = rIFA =
λρ
1−ψIFA
19Equation (79) is a quadratic function of Dt and there are two roots for Dt. However, only one root
satisfies the condition of ψit < Dt ≤ 1.
28
